COMMENTS
STOP PAYMENT: AN AILING SERVICE
TO THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
One hundred forty years ago, when checks played a less important role in
men's affairs, Lord Ellenborough announced1 that a stop payment order transforms a check into a "piece of waste paper," as far as the drawee bank is concerned.2 On its face, Lord Ellenborough's rule has meant that a banker who
inadvertently pays a stopped check can do little more than regret his mistake. 3
'4
In today's economy, checks far exceed in volume all other forms of "money,"
and bankers are striving to get out from under the risks imposed by the rule.
But, in accomplishing their objective, the banks may come close to eliminating
altogether the depositor's valued right to stop payment. This note will critically
survey the present law and some proposed changes, with an eye in particular on
the handiwork of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code.'

I
The operational effects of the present stop payment rules are clear. A bank
receiving a depositor's timely stop order is not authorized to pay the stopped
I Vienholt v. Spitta, 3 Camp. 376 (1813).
2 For a discussion of the early British and American cases on "countermand," see 1 Morse,
Banks and Banking § 398 (6th ed., 1928), and Chalmers, Bills of Exchange § 75 (10th ed.,
1932). And see note 6 infra.
3 In practice, of course, the banker is doubtless often able to settle with the depositor on
terms more favorable than might be had in the courts. For example, it can be supposed that
many depositors might be willing to assign to the bank any rights they have in the deal in
which the check was given, and that in certain cases the bank will ask that this be done. In
the case of a legal showdown, however, there is little support in the stop payment cases for
the position that the bank can so insist. See note 21 infra.
4 The average volume of demand deposits throughout 1952 approached $110 billions. The
average volume of currency, including Federal Reserve notes, was less than $29 billions. But
this is half the picture, or less. The average turnover of demand deposits was around twenty;
the comparable velocity figure for currency is much harder to determine with accuracy. See
38(2) Fed. Res. Bull. 1,299, 1,301 (1952). No accurate estimates are available of the number of
different checks cleared by the banks in the year: there were doubtless tens of billions of them.
A typical bank might have ten to several hundred outstanding stop orders.
5The final version of the proposed Code, American Law Institute, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code: Official Draft (text
and comments ed., 1952), is hereinafter cited by section numbers and as UCC.
For general discussions of the Code, and Articles 3 and 4 in particular, see Beutel, The
Proposed Uniform(?) Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334 (1952);
Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 Yale L.. 364
(1952); Tisdale, Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper, 26 N.D. Bar Briefs 252
(1950) and 27 N.D.L. Rev. 383 (1951); Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code,
Article 3, and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 Neb. L. Rev. 531 (1951), and Palmer,
Negotiable Instruments under the U.C.C., 48 Mich. L. Rev. 255 (1950).
A discussion of stop payment is undertaken in Stop Payment and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 28 Ind. L.J. 95 (1952). And consult, generally, Homer, The Stop Payment Order, 2
Baylor L. Rev. 275 (1950).
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check and cannot charge his account if it mistakenly does.6 To avoid the possibility of loss, the bank must assure itself that each of the items it pays is not a
stopped instrument, assuming the risk of a slip-up in its routine.
The drawer may stop payment for any reason that he likes-presumably, in
most cases, because of fraud or failure of consideration in the transaction in
which the check was given, or because the instrument itself is lost, strayed, or
stolen. If stop payment were not available, the check would be paid in the
normal course, and, to recover, the injured depositor would need to locate and
obtain jurisdiction over the holder ' -shady payees are forever absconding with
the cash-and bring suit on the underlying transaction, assuming the burdens
of litigation and execution of judgment. Stop payment turns the tables-secures
the status quo as to the drawer and makes resort to the courts unlikely if his
reasons for stopping payment are legally sufficient. Such effective control over
renegade checks yields clear social benefits-it may be of critical assistance to a
distressed depositor when no other help is available, it reduces litigation between depositors and payees, and it deters some forms of fraud and other commercial malpractices by payees.8 The loss of such benefits is the social cost when
the stop payment machinery fails.
The "real" cost of the stop payment operation is the value of resources,
primarily labor, expended in the mechanics of stopping checks. The "money"
cost, borne initially by the banks, includes not only the cost of the additional
effort but also an actuarial cost arising from the risk of paying the check without
recourse. The extra, noneconomic cost is the legal sanction imposed for failure,
6

In Florence Mining Co. v. Brown, 124 U.S. 385, 391 (1888), the Court said: "A check
upon the bank in the usual form, not accepted or certified by its cashier to be good, does not
constitute a transfer of any money to the credit of the holder; it is simply an order which may
be countermanded, and payment forbidden by the drawer at any time before it is actually

cashed."

In German Nat. Bank v. Farmers' Deposit Nat. Bank, 118 Pa. St. 294, 313, 12 At. 303,
305 (1888) a clear statement of the rule was made: "I presume no one at this day questions
the right of the drawer of a check to stop payment thereof.... If the bank pays after such
notice, it does so at its peril." At 5A Michie, Banks and Banking § 193 n. 45 (rev. ed., 1950)
are cited cases in which the rule appears, representing twenty-four states.
Throughout this note, reference made to checks will include notes and acceptances payable
at a bank, for which the rules as to stop payment are the same. 3 Paton, Dig. Leg. Op. 3485
(1944). But cf. Fiss Corp. v. National Safety Bank and Trust Co. of N.Y., 77 N.Y.S. 2d 293
(1948). See, generally, Steffen, Instruments "Payable at" a Bank, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 55

(1950).
I When a check has been fraudulently obtained, and the defrauding party retains an account
in the payee bank, the problem of the bank's liability for failure to stop payment blends into
that of the broader responsibility of a bank not to pay out deposits after notice of an adverse
legal claim. See, generally, Michie, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 88, and cases there cited.
8There is another side to stop payment, however; it is sometimes the case that the drawer
who stops payment is the wrongdoer. The payee may have carried out his end of the bargain
only to find that the drawer has stopped payment on his check solely to harass or to evade
payment of the amount owed. In electing not to give checks the effect of an assignment of
funds, those responsible for Section 189 of the NIL may have concluded that such eventualities
are not of sufficient commercial significance to warrant selection of the alternative treatment.
See note 12 infra.
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and serves to put teeth into the duty. It is the risk of severe legal penalty,
rather than the expense of the service itself, to which bankers say they object.9
Elementary applications of welfare economics principles would suggest that
the optimum effect of stop payment is achieved when the value of its social
bdnefits, in the marginal case, is equal to the real costs. 0 A tendency toward
automatic equilibrium can be built into the stop payment operation if the bank,
whose diligence alone can fend off the burden resulting from failure of stop payment, is made fully to bear that burden if it erroneously pays. Acting rationally,
it will then incur costs in attempting to stop payment up to the point where the
marginal costs are thought to be equal in amount to the attributable reduction
of risk of bearing the burden of failure. On reaching the optimum level of stop
payment activity, the bank will, of course, be able to reduce unpredicatable
losses to predictable expenses by insuring, and pass the cost of the service on to
its depositors generally and, in some part, by fee, specifically to those who have
occasion to use the service."
From this analysis, two propositions can be deduced. (1) The banks should
be required to continue to bear their long-established duty to render stop payment services. "Due care" or "good faith" as criteria for a bank's liability in
case of failure can only make uncertain the proper solution of the cost-minimizing, welfare-maximizing equation. (2) The legal sanction for failure should be
no more and no less than the social cost which the machinery is set up to avoidthat of locating and bringing suit against the person whose claim to the money
paid him is not good. A greater sanction increases the real cost of stop payment
by causing the bank to overexpend resources to avoid the greater loss, and depositors to overuse the stop payment machinery for speculative reasons.
Further, it makes stop payment a greater expense to the bank and the feepaying customer than it need be, and raises the possibility of unjust enrichment
of occasional depositors.
Against these criteria the present law and alternative proposals will be
measured.
II
The rules of stop payment may choose among a wide range of levels of duty
and sanctions in implementing public policy. At one extreme, imposing no duty
Laws Can Reduce Stop Payment Work, 64 Bankers' Monthly 331 (1947). This is not
surprising, for the scanning of checks necessary to stopping payment is ordinary procedure
which is necessary, in large part, in connection with checking for such other things as forgery,
alterations, correct and complete signatures, and adequacy of funds on deposit. For an account
of stop payment procedures followed in a number of banks studied in Philadelphia, see Moore
et al., Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment of Checks-I.
Institutional Method, 42 Yale L.. 1198 (1933).
10See, for a statement of the fundamental theory, Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, c. 2
(1920). The problem of the instant analysis is simplified because of the identity in this case
of private and social costs, and the method of bringing private costs and social benefits into
marginal equality. Other essential technical conditions here appear to be satisfied.
" Stop payment fees of varying amounts are now generally charged by banks. See Wilson,
Eight Ways to Ease the Load of Handling Stop Payments, 64 Bankers' Monthly 548 (1947).
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and no sanction would give the banker complete freedom to honor a stop
payment order, or not, as he might decide, with or without a charge for the
service. At the other extreme might be criminal sanctions. Within the range of
likely possibilities, courts and writers have considered three alternative levels
of duty: (1) not willfully or intentionally to disregard the order, (2) to exerhise
due care, and (3) the absolute duty of "strict liability." Failure to meet any such
standard of duty might call forth either of two suggested sanctions: liability only
for the actual damage to the depositor, or liability for the full face amount of the
paid instrument whether or not the depositor has suffered loss.
Decisions under the Negotiable Instruments Law, following the common
law, place upon the banker the most severe combination-strict liability for the
full amount of the stopped check. 12 This result is most often said to follow from
a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and the customer. 13 In accepting a checking account, the bank agrees to honor checks drawn upon it to the
amount of the indebtedness. A check is an order. Orders may be revoked until
acted upon. Therefore, an implied term of the deposit contract must be the right
of revocation, or stopping payment, and any payment made by the bank over a
timely stop order is unauthorized. 14 Liability for payment on "a piece of waste
"Sections 62 and 189 of the NIL are involved.
Section 62: "The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and admits: (1) The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument; and (2)The
existence of the payee and his then capacity to endorse." The majority interpretation finds
the doctrine of Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762), adopted by this section, and applicable to
cases of "payment" as well as "acceptance." See cases cited in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law § 62, at 905-6 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948). This doctrine bars recovery back from the
person paid on the basis of mistake of fact as to, among other things, authority granted by the
drawer. It holds the bank "bound to know" the state of the drawer's account, including stop
payment orders outstanding. And see note 22 infra.
Section 189: "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds
to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the bank is not liable to the holder, unless and
until it accepts or certifies the check." Since a check is not an assignment of the drawer's
funds, the bank is liable to him for paying it in disregard of a countermand. Cases are cited at
Brannan, op. cit. supra this note, at 1316. But a check may act as an assignment when it appears that this is the intention of the parties, and in such a case a stop order should have no
effect after the check is taken by a bona fide purchaser for value. Green v. Brown, 22 S.W.
2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929). See also Fourth Street Nat. Bank v. Yardley, 165 U.S. 634
(1897). Before the NIL, all checks acted as assignments in several jurisdictions: Idaho, Kaesemeyer v. Smith, 22 Ida. 1, 123 Pac. 943 (1942); Illinois, Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. Merchants,
Nat. Bank, 203 Ill. App. 561 (1916); Iowa, Leach v. Mechanics' Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 899,
211 N.W. 506 (1926); Kentucky, Boswell v. Citizens' Savings Bank, 123 Ky. 485, 96 S.W. 797
(1906); Louisiana, M. Feitel House Wrecking Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 159 La. 752, 106 So. 292
(1925); Nebraska, Superior Nat. Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 99 Neb. 833, 157 N.W.
1023 (1916); Massachusetts, Universal Supply Co. v. Hildreth, 287 Mass. 538, 192 N.E. 23
(1934); South Carolina, Peurifoy v. First Nat. Bank of Batesburg, 141 S.C. 370, 139 S.E. 793
(1927); South Dakota, Turner v. Hot Springs Nat. Bank, 18 S.D. 498, 101 N.W. 348 (1904);
and Wisconsin, In re Thornton's Guardianship, 243 Wis. 332, 10 N.W. 2d 193 (1943).
13See, e.g., In re Thornton's Guardianship, 243 Wis. 332, 10 N.W. 2d 193 (1943); Hunt v.
Security State Bank, 91 Ore. 352, 179 Pac. 248 (1919).
14Most of the litigation on stop orders deals with their "timeliness" and adequacy of
"form." To be effective a stop order must describe the check with reasonable accuracy, John
H. Mahon Co. v. Huntington Nat. Bank of Columbus, 62 Ohio App. 261, 23 N.E. 2d 638
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paper" cannot be avoided by showing good faith or due care. 15
A logical consequence of the contract theory of stop payment is that a
depositor may withdraw authorization for any reason that strikes his fancy,
just as an offer can be revoked at any time before it is acted upon."6 But stopping payment cannot affect the liability of the drawer on the instrument or on
(1939), and must be in the hands of the payee bank before it has paid or accepted the check.
Steiner v. Germantown Trust Co., 104 Pa. Super. 38, 158 At. 180 (1932), discussed in Moore,
op. cit. supra note 9. The moment at which a check is "paid" is not clear, but has been held
to be at the time when drawer's account is charged. Nineteenth Ward Bank v. First Nat. Bank
of South Weymouth, 184 Mass. 49, 67 N.E. 670 (1903). But a recent decision holds that payment is not made except by "actual payment either in cash or by a substitute accepted unconditionally by the payee," thus, that posting to the drawer's account and mailing a remittance to
the clearance house bank is not sufficient to foreclose a stop order. Bohlig v. First Nat. Bank in
Wadena, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W. 2d 445 (1951), noted in 5 Okla. L. Rev. 475 (1952), and
[19521 Wash. U.L.Q. 276. When the holder deposits the check to his account in the drawer
bank, the entry on the depositor's passbook is "payment." W. A. White Brokerage Co. v.
Cooperman, 207 Minn. 239, 290 N.W. 790 (1940). But see note 7 supra.
Branch banks are considered to be separate entities, so the drawer's right to countermand
continues good until the branch upon which the check is drawn has paid. Dean v. Eastern
Shore Trust Co., 159 Md. 213, 150 Atl. 797 (1930); Mullinax v. American Trust & Banking
Co., 189 Tenn. 220, 225 S.W. 2d 38 (1949).
Oral notice is sufficient, Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926);
as is an order by telephone, Shude v. American State Bank, 263 Mich. 519, 248 N.W. 886
(1933); Third Nat. Bank in Nashville v. Carver, 31 Tenn. App. 520, 218 S.W. 2d 66 (1948),
telegraph, Ozbum v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, 208 IM.App. 155 (1917), or to an
officer outside the bank. Hewitt v. First Nat. Bank of San Angelo, 113 Tex. 100, 252 S.W.
161 (1923). Where a statute or deposit contract requires that a stop order be in writing, the
bank waives its right to so insist by undertaking to act upon an oral order. Stamford State
Bank v. Miles, 186 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945) (state statute); Bohlig v. First Nat.
Bank in Wadena, 233 Minn. 523,48 N.W. 2d 445 (1951) (contract of deposit). In the absence
of statute, a stop order stays in force indefinitely, but forty jurisdictions now have statutes
limiting original effect to six months. 3 Paton, Dig. Leg. Ops. 3,462-63 (1944) and Supp.
(Dec., 1951).
The UCC would make several important changes and clarifications by providing in Section 4-303 that a stop order is effective "until but not after the bank has done any of the
following: ...(b) paid the item in cash; (c) settled the item by separate remittance for the
particular item; (d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the
drawer... or otherwise has evidenced by examination of such indicated account and by
action its decision to pay the item; or (e) become liable for the item under Section 4-302 dealing
with the payor bank's liability for late return of items." Section 4-403(2) provides: "An oral
order is binding upon the bank only until the customer has had reasonable opportunity to send
the bank a written confirmation if the bank requests such a confirmation. A written order is
effective for only six months unless renewed in writing."
The selection of controlling facts in any such sections as these must necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. The codifiers have clearly resolved most differences among the courts in manners highly favorable to the banks. But in these matters definiteness seems, perhaps, the highest desideratum.
" A more subtle contract-type analysis of stop payment is presented by Professor Underhill
Moore. The terms of the bargain are said to be "that the bank, in exchange for the deposit,
will upon actual demand of the customer repay the full amount of the deposit and that the
bank will, by honoring his checks, lend to the customer sums of money in amounts less than the
amount owed but which do not aggregate more than the deposit." Moore, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 818-19. In this analysis the presentment of a check is a condition precedent to the bank's
obligation and a request for a loan (which is at once set off against the depositor's balance, if
any). The presentment can be no request, of course, if the stop payment order has intervened.
16See Rest., Contracts §§ 35, 45-47 (1932).
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the underlying transaction. When a check deposited for collection and forwarded to the payee bank is returned, marked "Payment Stopped," to the
forwarding bank, its depositor must act to collect on the rejected instrument.
He may look to the drawer or, if such there be, any unqualified indorser. If he is
the payee or other holder "not in due course,""' recovery will be had from the
drawer if the only basis of the stop payment order is not such as to constitute a
good defense. 19 If a holder in due course, his much stronger position allows recovery free of the drawer's "personal" defenses. 20 An inadvertent payment by
the bank in such cases causes no real injury to its depositor. Nonetheless, because the bank is not permitted to charge the drawer's account after an unauthorized payment,2' and is seldom allowed to recover back from the person
paid,22 the bank that slips up will often find that it has discharged a legitimate
17See, e.g., Usher v. A. S. Tucker Co., 217 Mass. 441, 105 N.E. 360 (1914); Gulf Refining
Co. v. Bagby, 200 La. 258, 7 So. 2d 903 (1942).
18A "holder in due course" is defined in Section 52 of the NIL. See annotations to Sections 52 and 53, Brannan, op. cit. supra note 12, at 674-721. See also NIL § 58.
19As where the drawer stops payment because he "changes his mind" or where he is wrong
in his suspicions as to fraud or failure of consideration. But where drawer can interpose any
recognized equitable defense, a person with other than the rights of a holder in due course will
not recover. 1 Joyce, Defenses to Commercial Paper § 28 (2d ed., 1924).
20But will usually not recover if the drawer can show a "real" defense, e.g., that the title is
bad because of a forged or unauthorized material signature. For a discussion of the two categories of defenses, see Britton, Bills and Notes §§ 125-60 (1943).
21 Some writers contend that there now exists adequate support for a "rule" that the bank
can charge the drawer's account after mistaken payment to a holder in due course. Brady,
Bank Checks, 362-63 (2d ed., 1926). And see 3 Paton, Dig. Leg. Ops. 3464 (1944). Compare
Michie, op. cit. supra note 5, at 476; 6 Zollman, Banks and Banking 107 (1936). The case
most often cited in support of the asserted rule is Unaka Nat. Bank v. Butler, 113 Tenn. 574,
83 S.W. 655 (1904), where the payee of a check was not allowed recovery after the bank had
paid, over a stop order, to a holder in due course. It is impossible on close reading of the case not
to feel that the court became so interested in the subsidiary question of whether the holder of a
blank endorsed check which had been lost, found by a stranger, and negotiated again could
have a good title, that it failed to meet the central issue. At any rate the same court the next
year clearly drained the Butler case of force as precedent by a directly contrary ruling in a
case where suit was brought by the drawer. Pease & Dwyer v. State Nat. Bank, 114 Tenn. 693,

88 S.W. 172 (1905).
The somewhat different question of whether there is support for the position that the bank
may, after mistaken payment, be subrogated to the rights of the holder is discussed infra.
2
2A bank may almost never recover back payment made over a stop order to a holder in
due course. National Bank of N.J. v. Berrall, 70 N.J.L. 757, 58 Ad. 189 (1904); Huffman v.
Farmers' Nat. Bank, 10 S.W. 2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App., 1928); Rest., Restitution § 33 (1937).
Contra: National Loan & Exchange Bank v. Lachowitz, 131 S.C. 432, 128 S.E. 10 (1925). The
same rule is most often applied when the question is recovery from the payee or other holder.
Bank of Moultin v. Rankin, 222 Ala. 188, 131 So. 450 (1930); Albers v. Commercial Bank, 85
Mo. 173 (1884). And cf. National Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Madison, 270 App. Div.
437, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 832 (1946).
But where a check is paid by a bank as a result of the holder's fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, the payment may be recovered. Smith & McCrorken, Inc. v. Chatham Phenix Nat.
Bank & Trust Co., 239 App. Div. 318, 267 N.Y. Supp. 153 (1933).
A few more recent decisions have allowed recovery from the payee under certain conditions.
Murfreesboro Bank & Trust Co. v. Travis, 190 Tenn. 429, 230 S.W. 2d 658 (1950) (recovery
allowed where payee had given illegal consideration for the check): Union & New Haven Trust
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debt of its depositor out of its own pocket, with no likelihood of recovery. This
follows from the rule that after receipt of a stop order the bank has no more
authority to pay a holder in due course or other rightful claimant than an
offending payee.23 Thus, the present law imposes a far harsher sanction on the
24
banks than that which has been suggested as desirable.
Bankers, commentators, and the drafters of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code have each advanced proposals for mitigating the harshness of
these consequences of Lord Ellenborough's rule. The most common proposals
look toward (1) reducing the sanction for failure from liability for the full
amount of the check to that of bearing only what has been designated above
as the social cost of such failure-this involves making available to the payor
bank a theory of recovery in appropriate cases from either the depositor or the
party paid, or both; or (2) much more extreme, eliminating altogether or
moderating the banks' duty to act on stop orders, or allowing the bank to
"contract" for a lesser duty. Bankers have concentrated their attention on the
second;2 5 most writers approve the first;28 the drafters of the Code provide both,
27
and more.
To reduce the sanction for failure to the measure of social cost, or an approximation thereof, several theories have been advanced.
(1) In a suit by the drawer, after his account is charged, the bank might be
allowed to counterclaim as holder of the drawer's instrument as though undischarged. Section 119(1) of the NIL provides for discharge by payment "by or on
behalf of the principal debtor." "[O]n behalf of" requires, it is argued, a properly
authorized payor, and that after stop payment the bank does not qualify-thus
that the instrument may be treated as undischarged. 28 But Section 119(4)
allows discharge "by any act which would discharge a simple contract for the
Co. v. Thompson, 134 Conn. 607, 59 A. 2d 727 (1948) (dictum that recovery might be allowed
where payee has not changed position so as to be harmed by recovery). And cf. Central Nat.
Bank v. International Sales Co., 8 Ohio App. 293, 91 N.E. 2d 532 (1950).
23 See, e.g., Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 371, 248 Pac. 947, 950, 951 (1926).
Exceptions to the rule are found only in a few of the jurisdictions in which it was formerly
held that a drawer's check acted as a pro tanto assignment of his deposit; see note 12 supra.
24 See page 669 supra.
25 See the form of stop payment "request" prepared by the Legal Department of the
American Bankers' Association, reprinted at 3 Paton, Dig. Leg. Ops. 3,474-75 (1944), which,
if signed by the depositor, would probably relieve the bank of liability in almost any eventuality.
26Britton, Bills and Notes § 181 (1943); 3 Paton, Dig. Leg. Ops. 3,478 (1944); Recovery
against Depositor by Bank Paying Instrument after Stop Notice, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 110, 114
(1926); Recovery by Drawer against Bank for Payment of Check in Violation of Stop Paymnent Order, 45 Yale L.J. 1134, 1137 (1936).
2 The relevant provisions of the UCC are discussed pages 674 and 676 infra.
28This analysis is suggested in the concurring opinion by Bijur, J., in K. & K. Silk Trimming Co. v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 127 Misc. 27, 32, 215 N.Y. Supp. 269, 274 (S.Ct., 1926):
"In the case before us, since the maker had forbidden the bank to pay the note, its acquisition
thereof from the holder is not a discharge .... I see no reason in law or equity why the defendent bank is not the owner, entitled to counterclaim the amount thereof...."
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payment of money," which seems to cover the act of a paying stranger. 29 The
argument further appears to ignore the real intent of the parties and the general
understanding of bankers in the matter, as well as the rule that who is a party
to an instrument is a question of form, to be determined by inspection. 3 So the
theory, at best, is a shaky one.
(2) It has been argued3 that the bank should be allowed to defend against
the drawer under a rule of quasi-contracts allowing recovery for a benefit conferred under mistake as to the existence of facts affecting the obligation to
perform a contract. No stop payment case has been found which uses this
reasoning.
(3) The most favored theory is that of subrogation, a doctrine which is said
to suit any situation "where it is equitable that a person furnishing the money
to pay a debt would be substituted for the creditor."3 2As against the drawer, a
bank would be allowed to benefit from any rights which would have been available to the holder or payee to whom the bank made erroneous payment; in suit
for recovery from the payee or other holder, the bank could assert such rights as
the drawer might have in respect to the underlying transaction. In this way,
subrogation elegantly satisfies the sanction criterion suggested above: the real
burden that stop payment seeks to minimize-finding, and getting and executing judgment against a party wrongfully paid-is clearly placed upon the
bank, but there is no penalty for failure insofar as the failure causes no injury.
No party to a check could then be harmed or improved in his ultimate position
by a stop order, except as intended by the policy of the law. The incentive for
speculative stop payment is removed. Strict liability, in conjunction with the
subrogation remedy, efficiently transfers the risk of litigation from the drawer,
who is no longer in a position to reduce it, to the bank, which can, and will
automatically solve the social welfare-maximizing equation in attending to its
own interests.
The symmetrical subrogation remedy is advanced in Section 4-407 of the
Code.3 3 In promulgating it, the drafters have wisely adapted a powerful tool of
equity to a use for which it has been widely recommended, but seldom employed
by the courts. 34 The result should prove to be a considerable advance.
29See Rest., Contracts § 421 (1932).
30 Joyce, op. cit. supra note 19, at § 51.
31Harvard L. Rev., op. cit. supra note 26.
1" Sherman v. Yarbo Products Corp., 201 App. Div. 64-7, 194 N.Y. Supp. 705, 706 (1922).
13Such a remedy was included as early as 1934 in drafts prepared by Professor Roscoe
Steffen of a Uniform Bank Collection Code. Fifth Tentative Draft § 14, Handbook of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 172 (1934). This act was never
promulgated to the legislatures. The earlier American Bankers' Association Collection Code,
enacted by eighteen states, has no comparable provision.
34 The General Counsel of the American Bankers' Association expresses the opinion that "a
bank would seem to be entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the drawer against the payee."
But no cases are cited. 3 Paton, Dig. Leg. Ops. 3475, 3478 (1944). To support the statement
that the bank may be subrogated to the rights of the payee against the drawer, Professor
Britton cites only one case, and that of doubtful relevance. Britton, Bills and Notes § 181
n.5 (1943).
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III
The bankers have advanced a less elegant but highly effective remedy for the
stop payment malaise--eliminate the stop payment duty altogether. This they
have sought to do contractually by placing in passbooks and stop order forms
clauses which exculpate the bank from liability in cases of payment "through
inadvertence, accident, or oversight."35 Such clauses have now been tested in the
courts of nine states.36
In New York, Massachusetts, and Indiana, the clauses have been held valid.
In Gaita v. Windsor Bantk, 37 the leading New York case, the court recognizes
that the common law duty of the bank is absolute, and that a depositor may
hold a bank to that duty, but allows "freedom of contract" where the depositor
has signed away his right-the clause is not void as against public policy. The
Massachusetts 8 and Indiana39 courts agree.
In California, 4 Ohio, 4' and Pennsylvania2 the exculpatory clause cited is
contrary to public policy, whether it appears in the original passbook contract
or on stop order forms which a poorly advised depositor signs at a bank's behest.
The highest Connecticut 43 and New Jersey 44 courts have also struck down such
clauses in the cases coming before them, but on the grounds that where the
clause is found in the stop order form the bank gives no consideration for the
3See

note 25 supra.

36See, generally, Exculpation Clauses in Stop-Payment Orders, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 577

(1952); Stipulation Relieving Bank from, or Limiting Its Liability for Disregard of, StopPayment Order, 1 A.L.R. 2d 1155 (1948).
37 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929). This decision reversed the older New York rule
announced in Elder v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 25 Misc. 716, 55 N.Y. Supp. 576 (S.Ct., 1899), and
Levine v. Bank of the U.S., 132 Misc. 130, 229 N.Y. Supp. 108 (N.Y. Munic. Ct., 1928).
It has been followed in the subsequent decisions: Edwards v. National City Bank of N.Y., 150
Misc. 80,269 N.Y. Supp. 637 (N.Y. Munic. Ct., 1934); Pyramid Musical Corp. v. Floral Park
Bank, 268 App. Div. 783, 48 N.Y.S. 2d 866 (1944); Chase Nat. Bank v. Battat, 297 N.Y. 185,
78 N.E. 2d 465 (1948); Cortilion Fabrics Corp. v. National Safety Bank & Trust Co. of N.Y.,
193 Misc. 741, 84 N.Y.S. 2d 880 (S.Ct., 1949); In re Rousos' Will, 195 Misc. 959, 91 N.Y.S. 2d
551 (Surr. Ct., 1949).
31Tremont Trust Co. v. Vurack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920).
39Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N.E. 488 (1932).
40Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac. 947 (1926); Grisinger v. Golden
State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 Pac. 425 (1928).
4'

Speroff v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E. 2d 119 (1948), noted in 17

Fordham L. Rev. 268 (1948), 24 Notre Dame Lawyer 117 (1948), 9 Ohio St. L.J. 543 (1948),
34 Va. L. Rev. 834 (1948), 33 Minn. L. Rev. 179 (1949), and 18 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 105 (1949).

This case overrules John H. Mahon Co. v. Huntington Nat. Bank, 62 Ohio App. 261, 23 N.E.
2d 638 (1939).
12 Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 126 L.I. 203 (Pa., 1952), noted in 25 Temp. L.Q.
486 (1952), and 2 Catholic U.L. Rev. 128 (1952). Cf. Cohen v. Bank of Philadelphia, 69 Pa.
Super. 48 (1917).
41 Calamita v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A. 2d 46 (1949), noted in 25
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 419 (1950).
44 Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A. 2d 741
(1951), noted in 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 345 (1952).
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depositor's waiver of his right. And in South Carolina, the Supreme Court
found for the depositor without passing upon the clause by holding that the
burden of proof that the failure was "mere inadvertence or oversight" was on
the bank when it pleaded the 'clause in bar, and had not been met.
The most persuasive opinion on the subject is also the most recent-that of
the Superior Court of New Jersey in Reinhardtv. Passaic-CliftonNationalBank
Trust Company.4 The plaintiff had signed a stop order form provided by the
bank containing a small-print exculpation clause. A notice to the clerks was duly
recorded on the jacket over the ledger sheet of the plaintiff's account, but the
check was paid. Reviewing all the cases, the court decided on the narrower
ground of failure of consideration for the release, recognizing that the liability
which the bank sought to avoid was "not dependent on the proof that the bank
failed to exercise reasonable care," and suggesting stronger medicine, if need be,
in the future:
Perhaps the bank and its depositor may, in legal contemplation, be viewed as
having equal bargaining power and freedom of contract, although full recognition of

modern day realities may well suggest a contrary conclusion .... Nevertheless, the

bank has been entrusted with an important franchise to serve the public and has,

from time to time, received broad legislative protection .... Under the circumstances

might it not be appropriate to apply to banks the legal doctrine which has deprived
quasi-public enterprises such as utilities47of the power to require release clauses comparable to that used by the defendant?
In avoiding the effect of the clause, the California and Ohio courts have, on
the other hand, fallen into an easy error. They throw out the clause as contravening public policy against "escaping liability for one's own negligence by
contract."48 The exculpatory clauses, of course, do seek to do this, but they also
attempt more-to contract away the greater duty required by the traditional
strict liability. These cases are thus made to turn on a weaker ratio decidendi
than was available; more important, their language indicates a confusion as to
the traditional stop payment rule. These misplaced words have found their way
into the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 4-103 providing:
The effect of this Article may be varied by agreement except that no agreement
can disclaim a bank's responsibility or limit the measure of damages for its own lack
of good faith orfailure to exercise due care. (Emphasis added.)
This section, in effect, reduces the bank's duty from its traditional level to
the lower requirement of "good faith" and "due care." Furthermore, under the
Code's rule, the depositor's simple cause of action in pleading payment over a
stop order49 becomes one in which it is necessary to show that the operation of
the bank's check-stopping machinery, at the fateful moment, was not on a par
4'Carroll v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 45 S.E. 2d 729 (1947).
47Ibid., at 436 and 744.
46 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 A. 2d 741 (1951).
8
4 I-iroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 378, 248 Pac. 947, 953 (1926).
41 The necessary allegations in an action by a drawer on failure of stop payment are (1) that
plaintiff had money on deposit, (2) that the check was issued, (3) that a stop payment order was
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with the standard and reasonable practice set by the banking community, a
task which a depositor is in a singularly poor position to undertake, regardless of
the facts of the case."0
Perhaps some courts, faced with the Code's provision, might follow the lead
of the South Carolina decision,5' salvaging in part the stop payment duty by
placing the burden of proof on the bank as to absence of negligence, or by
directing the jury's attention to the inferences which arise from a situation
when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate. 2
But even so, it is difficult to understand the inclusion of this provision in the
same Article which recognizes the only major flaw in the present stop payment
rules, and handsomely corrects its unreasonable harshness on payor banks by
allowing subrogation. It would seem more reasonable for the Code to have
chosen the course of efficiency and simplicity by making explicit the public
policy which for more than a century has defined stop payment as a service to
the business community which a bank must perform, if it is to be done at all,
because there is no one else who can.
given, (4) that the check was nevertheless paid, and (5) that the money was demanded from
the drawee, which demand was refused. 6 Zollman, Banks and Banking § 3711 (1936).
The UCC provides specifically only that: "The burden of establishing the fact and amount
of loss resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop order is on the customer." UCC § 4-403(3). The critical question-who bears the burden of proof as to "due
care"-is not treated. The usual rule would appear to apply. See note 51 infra.
50 A somewhat comparable situation is that in which a depositor claims loss of property
from a bank safe deposit box. In spite of the ease of perjury in the deposit box cases, the
courts have often, although not always, ruled that there is a presumption of negligence on the
part of the depositary arising from the depositor's testimony that the property was placed in
the box and never returned. See e.g., Veihelmann v. Manufacturers' Safe Deposit Co., 303 N.Y.
526, 104 N.E. 2d 888 (1952). The outcome may depend on the form of the depositor's complaint. See Liability for Loss-of Contents of Safe-Deposit Box, 133 A.L.R. 279, 291 (1941);
Ability of Banks to Limit Liability by Contract, 26 Notre Dame Lawyer 476 (1951).
61Carroll v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, 211 S.C. 406, 412, 45 S.E. 2d 729, 731 (1947),
where the court said, "[Wie think the admitted facts show a prima fade case of liability and the
burden of producing evidence to overcome appellant's prima facie case by showing that it
acted in good faith and used all reasonable efforts to comply with the instructions given
rested on respondent.... Appellant would not be expected to know these facts." And see
Chicago Savings Bank v. Block, 126 11.App. 128, (1906). Apparently this rule is followed in
Pennsylvania. Thomas v. First Nat. Bank of Scranton, 126 L.I. 203 (Pa., 1952). But the general rule is that the full burden of proof must be sustained by the drawer. 9 C.J.S., Banks and
Banking § 411 (1938).
"See Prosser, Torts §§ 43, 44 (1941).

DEFAMATION IMMUNITY FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
The increasing publicity afforded the workings of government and the current concern over subversive activity' present in an acute form the familiar
I For other examples of the impact of the fear of subversion on traditional areas of the law,
see Communists and the Right to Bail, 20 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 330 (1953); Defamation Immunity, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1951).

